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IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE 
Amicus curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund (“EFELDF”), 
a nonprofit Illinois corporation, submits this amicus brief with the consent of all 
parties.1 Since its founding in 1981, EFELDF has consistently defended traditional 
American values, including not only traditional marriage, defined as the union of 
husband and wife, but also the religious freedoms that were instrumental in this 
Nation’s founding. Although the Supreme Court recently held that our 
“Constitution … does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage 
on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex,” even the Court 
acknowledged that the “First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and 
persons are given proper protection.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 
(2015). This litigation presents the new issue of how to balance the important 
interests at stake on all sides. For the foregoing reasons, EFELDF has direct and 
vital interests in the issues raised here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are same-sex and opposite-sex couples (the “Couples”) residing in 
Rowan County, Kentucky, who wish to obtain marriage licenses. The defendant is 
the Rowan County Clerk (the “Clerk”), whom Kentucky law authorizes to issue 
                                           
1  Pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned counsel certifies that: 
counsel for amicus authored this brief in whole; no counsel for a party authored 
this brief in any respect; and no person or entity – other than amicus, its members, 
and its counsel – contributed monetarily to this brief’s preparation or submission. 




marriage licenses. In its current configuration, Kentucky’s marriage-license form 
would require the Clerk to violate her faith if she issued a marriage license bearing 
her name and imprimatur for a same-sex marriage, and she has filed a third-party 
complaint against appropriate Kentucky officials to achieve an accommodation 
under which the Couples' demands for same-sex marriage licenses would not 
infringe her religious-freedom rights. 
Consequently, the Clerk ceased dispensing marriage licenses to anyone, 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent holding that the “Constitution … does 
not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as 
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 
2607 (2015) (emphasis added). Under Kentucky law, however, the Couples are 
free to obtain marriage licenses at numerous other locations statewide including 
every other county seat, both in person and by mail: 
The license shall be issued by the clerk of the county in 
which the female resides at the time, unless the female is 
eighteen (18) years of age or over or a widow, and the 
license is issued on her application in person or by 
writing signed by her, in which case it may be issued by 
any county clerk. 
KY. REV. STAT. §402.080. Moreover, the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“Kentucky RFRA”) ameliorates §402.080 by providing that the “right to act 
or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not 
be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing 




evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific 
act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest.” 
KY. REV. STAT. §446.350. 
Even without Kentucky RFRA’s required accommodation of the Clerk’s 
religious beliefs, §402.080 enables Kentucky adults and widows to obtain marriage 
licenses from any county clerk.2 Indeed, marriage licenses were available in the 
two metropolitan areas to which the Couples have travelled to attend proceedings 
before the district court below, to say nothing of the several counties through 
which the Couples would have had to travel to attend those hearings. See Davis Br. 
at 14 (60 miles to Ashland and 100 miles to Covington).3 The Couples’ traveling 
those distances clearly did not present a significant burden. 
Notwithstanding both Kentucky RFRA and the ease of the Couples’ 
obtaining licenses via alternate means, the district court viewed the Clerk’s failure 
                                           
2  Even for minors, a marriage would not be invalid because the license was 
issued in the wrong county. Gatewood v. Tunk, 6 Ky. 246 (Ky. 1813) (decided 
under prior law). 
3  Catlettsburg (the county seat of Boyd County) is in the Huntington-Ashland-
Ironton metropolitan area, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, “May 
2014 Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area Definitions” (Mar. 25, 2015) 
(available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/msa_def.htm#26580) (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2015), and Covington is one of the two county seats of Kenton County. See 
Kentucky Dep’t for Libraries and Archives, “Kentucky County Formation Chart” 
(available at http://kdla.ky.gov/researchers/Pages/countyformationchart.aspx) (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2015). 




to do her “statutorily assigned duties” under §402.080 as the key question: 
[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs have one feasible avenue 
for obtaining their marriage licenses – they must go to 
another county. Davis makes much of the fact that 
Plaintiffs are able to travel, but she fails to address the 
one question that lingers in the Court’s mind. Even if 
Plaintiffs are able to obtain licenses elsewhere, why 
should they be required to? The state has long entrusted 
county clerks with the task of issuing marriage licenses. 
It does not seem unreasonable for Plaintiffs, as Rowan 
County voters, to expect their elected official to perform 
her statutorily assigned duties. And yet, that is precisely 
what Davis is refusing to do. 
PgID.1159 (emphasis added). In granting injunctive relief, the district court relied 
on the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception to sovereign immunity for 
the authority to enjoin the Clerk’s marriage policies. PgID.1153-54 & n.4. The 
district court subsequently imprisoned her for refusing to violate her religious 
beliefs by issuing same-sex marriage licenses. Davis Br. at 23-24. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus EFELDF adopts the facts as stated in the Clerk’s brief. Davis Br. at 
9-26. In summary, the Clerk has religious objections to distributing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples in the Kentucky marriage license’s current form, she 
has taken reasonable steps to cure the disconnect between her beliefs and the 
current form, she has applied her no-license policy evenhandedly to same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples, and the Couples could obtain marriage licenses more easily 
than filing this suit, either in person or by mail, without significant effort. 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the Couples demand their rights under Obergefell, this litigation 
requires the Court to balance the Couples’ asserted marriage rights with the Clerk’s 
religious-freedom rights. Because Obergefell acknowledged but did not resolve 
that conflict by setting the appropriate test for striking that balance (Section I.A), 
federal law is “deficient … to furnish suitable remedies” under 42 U.S.C. 
§1988(a). Thus, a federal court evaluating this conflict could look to Kentucky 
RFRA to balance these interests (Section I.D). Without resort to Kentucky law, 
moreover, the Clerk’s no-marriage-license policy does not violate purely federal 
law: (a) as to equal-protection, the Clerk evenhandedly denied licenses to all 
couples consistent with Obergefell (Section I.B), and (b) as to due-process, the 
minor imposition of seeking licenses in-person or via mail from adjacent counties 
or the capital does not sufficiently impair marriage rights under Circuit precedent 
to trigger stringent review, and Kentucky RFRA’s accommodation of the Clerk’s 
religious views qualifies as a sufficiently rational government interest to defeat the 
Couples’ purely federal due-process claims (Section I.C).  
As indicated, Kentucky law requires the balancing of the Clerk’s obligations 
under §402.080 with the accommodations that Kentucky RFRA provides (Section 
II.A). Significantly, although the district court disagreed with the Clerk’s reading 
of Kentucky RFRA, federal courts lack the authority to narrow state laws by 




interpretation (Section II.B), which counsels for federal courts’ avoiding this issue 
entirely under three separate jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional bases.  
Kentucky clerks implementing state marriage policies share the State’s 
sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment (Section III.A.1), 
and the Young exception to sovereign immunity requires an ongoing violation of 
federal law: mere violations of state law are insufficient to avoid the Clerk’s 
immunity (Section III.A.3). Similarly, if the Clerk is not immune, the Couples 
could assert – but have not asserted – supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1367; but supplemental jurisdiction is inappropriate where the state-law claim 
predominates or requires a novel or complex ruling under state law, which is 
precisely the case with the conflict between §402.080 and Kentucky RFRA 
(Section III.C). Finally, while incorporating Kentucky RFRA via §1988(a) might 
save the Clerk, the same is not true for incorporating §402.080 to aid the Couples. 
First, federal law is adequate to define due-process protections here, without 
incorporating §402.080’s county-of-residence provisions into the Couples’ federal 
claims; second, the Couples cannot cherry-pick Kentucky law by incorporating 
§402.080 without Kentucky RFRA’s accommodations; and third, if the Court finds 
Kentucky RFRA inconsistent with federal law, §1988(a) cannot incorporate any 
Kentucky law into the Couples’ federal claims, thus defeating the district court’s 
reliance on perceived statutory duties (Section III.B).  





I. THE CLERK DID NOT VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW. 
The same-sex plaintiffs driving this litigation impatiently assert their new 
rights under Obergefell and thus frame this litigation exclusively as the denial of 
their claimed right to “secur[e] a valid marriage license in Rowan County, 
Kentucky.” Compl. ¶¶48, 58 (PgID.11, 13). Even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Couples, however, this litigation requires the balancing of 
competing rights.4 Moreover, in the context of balancing the competing federal 
rights at issue, federal civil-rights law provides for looking to state laws such as 
Kentucky RFRA when federal law itself does not provide a framework for striking 
the right balance. 
A. Although it created and acknowledged the conflict between same-
sex marriage and religious freedom, Obergefell did not resolve 
that conflict. 
Although the Couples emphasize that the Clerk is a public officer, we are 
long past the era of Justice Holmes’ famous dictum that a policeman “may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 
(Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). As a result, public officers and employees no longer 
“may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights” in 
                                           
4  As explained herein, EFELDF respectfully submits that the Couples do not, 
in fact, have significant federal rights to assert here.  




all circumstances. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); cf. Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (government cannot condition public benefits on 
accepting Saturday employment if that is contrary to religious faith). The question 
presented here is how to balance the Couples’ new rights with the Clerk’s rights. 
Of course, courts routinely balance rights against each other. See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) 
(women’s right to abortion versus states’ right to regulate women’s health and 
interest in the unborn child’s life); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398-
99 (1979) (criminal defendants’ due-process rights versus the media’s and the 
public’s freedom of the press). When federal courts strike such balances in specific 
contexts – especially in areas of judge-made law – the resulting balancing test 
necessarily appears nowhere in the Constitution. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 
(creating “undue-burden” test); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 
547-48 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the Supreme Court recognized 
more than 100 years after the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
States did not intend to create a right to same-sex marriage, Baker v. Nelson, 409 
U.S. 810 (1972), but the Court has found in that Amendment a principle that 
purportedly allows it to infer such rights. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598. The 
implications of Obergefell necessarily remain for the lower federal courts and 
ultimately for the Supreme Court to resolve. 




Specifically, the Court created a new right to same-sex marriage, recognized 
that that new right may conflict with religious liberty, but has not yet provided a 
balancing test for resolving the inevitable conflicts. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607. 
The Court may ultimately adopt the rule of Employment Div., Dep’t of Human 
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (“an individual’s 
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate”), but it may not. 
Alternatively, or in addition, federal courts may look to state law under Empire 
Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2006) (“prudent 
course … is often to adopt the ready-made body of state law as the federal rule of 
decision until Congress strikes a different accommodation”) (internal quotation 
omitted), but it may not. This case of first impression therefore requires this Court 
to strike a balance between the Clerk’s rights and the Couples’ rights. 
B. The Clerk did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
As signaled above, Obergefell found the same-sex marriage rights to lie 
under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. As explained 
here and in the next subsection, however, the Clerk’s actions do not directly violate 
either of those two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
First, the evenhandedness of the Clerk’s denying marriage licenses to both 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples defeats any claim to an equal-





[W]hen the right invoked is that to equal treatment, the 
appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a 
result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits 
from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits 
to the excluded class 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984) (emphasis in original, interior 
quotations omitted). The Clerk has adopted an interim solution that, quite frankly, 
could qualify as a permanent solution under the Equal Protection Clause. The 
treatment is entirely equal. But even the Clerk does not propose that her interim 
solution remain in place forever. Instead, her third-party complaint seeks relief 
from Kentucky that would alleviate the need for her to violate her religious beliefs 
while enabling Couples (and future couples) to obtain marriage licenses even in 
Rowan County. See Davis Br. at 15-16. In any event, there clearly is no ongoing 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
C. The Clerk did not violate the Due Process Clause. 
Second, although the due-process analysis requires more rigor than the 
equal-protection analysis, there is no due-process violation, either. Even without 
the problem of a court’s needing to balance competing federal rights discussed in 
Section I.A, supra, no appellate marriage-rights decision has ever found an 
absolute due-process right to obtain a marriage license in one’s county of 
residence, especially when marriage licenses are readily available nearby. Cf. 




Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (significant travel distances for women seeking an abortion 
do not violate that judge-made right). Accordingly, there is no substantive due-
process right to obtain marriage licenses in Rowan County arising directly from the 
Due Process Clause. 
Viewed in its entirety as applied here, Kentucky law creates a marriage-
license doughnut hole, with licenses available to the Couples statewide, either in 
person or by mail, under §402.080, but not in Rowan County under Kentucky 
RFRA. If the Clerk prevails in her suit against Kentucky, she will have established 
either a process or a form that will ensure the availability of marriage licenses in 
Rowan County, as well. Given the travel distances permissibly imposed in the 
abortion context, Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, it would be risible to claim a substantive 
due-process violation if Kentucky’s Legislature had affirmatively enacted the same 
doughnut hole5 that has resulted from the operation of Kentucky RFRA. In order 
for the Couples to prevail under a due-process theory, this Court would need to 
hold that marriage licenses must be available in each county. That would mean that 
states could not make licenses available only by mail from the capital. While such 
                                           
5  Although the doughnut-hole concept apparently has legal meaning, Buono v. 
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir. 2008); 152 Cong Rec H162 (Feb. 8, 
2006) (Mr. DeFazio); Lancaster, South Carolina Code of Ordinances §28-1(5), 
Rowan County is more of a pinhole vis-à-vis Kentucky’s 120 counties. Only if 
viewed in isolation as Rowan County and the seven counties that surround it would 
Rowan County qualify as something as big as a doughnut hole. 




a holding would be absurd, it is the clear – if unexamined – implication of the 
district court’s decision. 
1. Obergefell did not find a due-process right to in-person 
marriage licenses in one’s county of residence. 
The consolidated Obergefell cases addressed the availability of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples, not where or how states must dispense those licenses. 
As such, and regardless of its grandiose language, Obergefell did not – and could 
not –decide where or how states must dispense marriage licenses: “our remark in 
[an earlier decision] … is obviously not controlling, coming as it did in an opinion 
that did not present the question we decide in these cases.” United States Nat’l 
Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n.11 (1993) 
(emphasizing “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”). To the 
extent that any Obergefell language would support that perceived right, that 
language would be mere dicta because the Court did not face that specific 
question: “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt 
with.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994). As to the issues that 
Obergefell did not necessarily decide against the state defendants there, marriage 
policy remains “a virtually exclusive province of the States.” U.S. v. Windsor, 133 
S.Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013). Obergefell itself clearly did not decide this case. 




2. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee a due-process 
right to in-person marriage licenses in counties of residence. 
Nothing in the Windsor or Obergefell decisions even remotely suggests that 
states could not elect to evenhandedly distribute marriage licenses online or from 
the state capitol via the mail. The district court rejected these potential “someday” 
modes of dispensing licenses as irrelevant, PgID.1159 (“these options may be 
available someday, [but] they are not feasible alternatives at present”), but that is 
only because the district court held the Clerk to perceived “statutorily assigned 
duties” under Kentucky law. Id. In taking that approach, the district court 
improperly incorporated state law into the federal due-process analysis.6 For 
purposes of a purely federal due-process analysis, nothing credibly suggests that 
states must dispense marriage licenses in-person to residents in every county.  
3. The Clerk’s policy would not violate a due-process right to 
in-person marriage licenses in one’s county of residence, 
even if such a right existed. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Couples have a federal due-process right 
to marriage licenses in their county of residence, the Clerk’s policy would not 
violate that right. In the interest of the religious-freedom rights that Obergefell 
itself recognized, Kentucky RFRA burdens marriage rights by allowing 
accommodation of the Clerk’s religious beliefs with the minor burdens imposed on 
                                           
6  While §1988(a) may allow the incorporation of some state-law standards 
into a federal due-process claim, that is not the case for Kentucky law here. See 
Sections II, III.B, infra. 




the Couples. For burdens on even fundamental rights to become impermissible, 
those burdens must “directly and substantially” interfere with the right. Lyng v. 
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 
(1978); Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004). “Our 
analysis of the case law … indicated that we would find direct and substantial 
burdens only where a large portion of those affected by the rule are absolutely or 
largely prevented from marrying, or where those affected by the rule are absolutely 
or largely prevented from marrying a large portion of the otherwise eligible 
population of spouses.” Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 
(6th Cir. 2001).Thus, the Couples’ claimed injuries do not trigger stringent review. 
Short of that, rational-basis review applies, Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 
1030, 1040 (6th Cir. 2003), and is easily met by the need for religious 
accommodation. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (alleviating burdens on religious 
freedom is a permissible legislative purpose). Even if the Couples had the rights 
they claim – and they do not – the Couples would not prevail. 
D. Section 1988(a) potentially imports state law into federal claims. 
The Clerk has asserted rights under Kentucky RFRA against compelling her 
to violate her religious beliefs, but the district court rejected the use of Kentucky 
law. Amicus EFELDF respectfully submits that, given the absence of federal law to 




resolve the balancing of the Clerk’s religious freedom versus the Couples’ 
marriage rights, a federal court should look to state law “so far as the same is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. 
§1988(a).7 Because existing federal precedents and laws do not guide federal 
courts on how to balance the rights at issue here, this Court could look to Kentucky 
RFRA. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985); Wilson v. Morgan, 477 
F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2007). Nothing in Kentucky RFRA is affirmatively 
inconsistent with federal law.8 
By way of background, Congress enacted §1988(a)’s precursor on April 9, 
1866, before the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, Ch 31, §3, 14 Stat. 27 
(1866), then re-enacted it pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1870. Ch. 114, §18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). Where it applies, §1988(a) “adopt[s] 
the statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law” so that “federal 
law incorporates the State’s judgment on the proper balance between the policies 
[at issue, such as repose] and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in 
                                           
7  As used in §1988(a), “Title 24” includes 28 U.S.C. §1343 and 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 n.7 (1972).  
8  On the other hand, it is entirely unclear whether §1988(a) would allow the 
Couples to incorporate §402.080 into their due-process claim: “The express terms 
of § 1988(a) prevent us from replacing federal law with more favorable state law.” 
Morgan, 477 F.3d at 332 (emphasis in original); cf. Section I.C.2, supra (resolving 
the Couples’ due-process claim under purely federal law). 




the state cause of action.” Garcia, 471 U.S. at 271. This Court should not lightly 
reject an act of Congress pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment that was not only 
enacted contemporaneously with the Amendment’s ratification but also modeled 
on existing law previously adopted by the ratifying generation. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has held the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“Federal RFRA”) to lie outside the scope of Section 5 because 
Federal RFRA simultaneously sought both to restore a strict-scrutiny standard in 
place of the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith and to adopt federal law over state 
law in countless areas. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997). 
Here, of course, one half of the Boerne rationale is wholly absent: Congress did not 
offend federalism in 1866 or 1870 by adopting Kentucky law for federal civil-
rights actions in Kentucky. 
The remaining Boerne rationale – separation of powers – would be 
inadequate by itself to deny the Clerk resort to Kentucky RFRA for three reasons. 
First, as she argues, her religious-freedom rights under state law outweigh the 
minor burden (if any) on the Couples’ federal rights under the Obergefell decision. 
Second, §1988(a)’s standard of “not inconsistent” is an easier standard to meet 
than the “enforce versus legislate” distinction at issue in the Boerne decision: it 
would remain “not inconsistent” with federal law to use standards that the Supreme 
Court has used in religious-freedom cases, even if that were not the standard of 




review that that Court ultimately adopts to fill the gap that Obergefell left open. 
Third, until the Supreme Court clears the religious-freedom ambiguity left 
unresolved by Obergefell, there is no federal law against which to measure 
Kentucky RFRA’s consistency.9 
II. THE CLERK DID NOT VIOLATE KENTUCKY LAW. 
To the extent that it relied on §402.080, PgID.1159 (discussing the Clerk’s 
“statutorily assigned duties”), the district court failed adequately to consider how 
Kentucky RFRA modifies the Clerk’s §402.080 obligations. As explained in this 
section, Kentucky RFRA requires accommodating the Clerk’s religious views, and 
this Court lacks the power to ameliorate Kentucky law to avoid any perceived 
unconstitutionality of Kentucky RFRA. Consequently, the Clerk did not violate 
§402.080, and this Court cannot enforce §402.080 by disregarding or narrowing 
Kentucky RFRA. 
A. Kentucky RFRA modifies the Clerk’s obligations under §402.080. 
As indicated, the district court gave short shrift to Kentucky RFRA’s 
ameliorating §402.080’s requirements. Given the minimal burdens imposed on the 
Couples, Kentucky RFRA clearly allows the Clerk’s reasonable accommodations. 
                                           
9  A fourth distinction under §1988(a) applies in reverse. Even if this Court 
finds Kentucky RFRA inconsistent with Obergefell and Smith, the Couples cannot 
rely on §1988(a) to import §402.080 into their federal claims: either this Court 
adopts Kentucky law as a whole, or it does not adopt Kentucky law at all. See 
Section III.B, infra.  




Significantly, Kentucky RFRA was codified in Chapter 446, which concerns 
the “construction of statutes.” See KY. REV. STAT. §446.350. Under Kentucky law, 
“the more specific and later-enacted statute … supersede[s] and supplant[s] any 
conflicting provisions … contained in … widely dispersed statutes.” Pearce v. 
Univ. of Louisville, 448 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Ky. 2014). For both reasons, an 
appropriate court should find that – as a matter of Kentucky law – Kentucky RFRA 
supplants §402.080’s obligations to require accommodating the Clerk’s religion. 
First, Kentucky RFRA postdates §402.080 and thus has a superior claim to 
control here. Compare 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 279, §1 (§402.080 last amended in 1984) 
with 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 111, §1 (Kentucky RFRA enacted in 2013). Kentucky 
RFRA thus controls interpreting §402.080’s scope. 
Second, Kentucky RFRA was obviously specifically intended to control 
general statutes such as §402.080. Same-sex-marriage supporters recently vilified 
Arkansas and Indiana for adopting state RFRAs that would allegedly negatively 
impact rights like those that the Couples assert. See, e.g., Monica Davey, et al., 
After Rights Clash, Two States Revise Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2015, at 
A12. Claiming that Kentucky RFRA has no bearing here represents a remarkably 
disingenuous reversal.  
But even assuming arguendo that the second factor – specificity – favored 
the Couples, while the temporal factor favors the Clerk, this would remain a suit 




that belongs in state court. As explained below, federal courts cannot resolve novel 
and complicated issues of state law. 
B. Federal courts lack authority to interpret Kentucky RFRA 
narrowly to cure perceived constitutional defects. 
A federal court lacks the power to adjudicate this dispute under Kentucky 
law because federal courts cannot balance §402.080’s obligation against Kentucky 
RFRA’s accommodations. Consequently, although the Couples could have filed 
their suit in Kentucky’s state courts, their chosen forum must dismiss this action to 
the extent that the Couples premise their alleged rights on §402.080. 
Specifically, federal courts lack the authority to adopt the type of narrowing 
construction of state law needed to disregard Kentucky’s RFRA’s amelioration of 
§402.080: “Federal courts do not sit as a super state legislature, [and] may not 
impose [their] own narrowing construction ... if the state courts have not already 
done so.” United Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. 
IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 431 (8th Cir. 1988) (interior quotations omitted, 
alterations in original); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“it 
is not within our power to construe and narrow state laws”). Instead, “a federal 
court must take the state statute or municipal ordinance as written and cannot find 
the statute or ordinance constitutional on the basis of a limiting construction 
supplied by it rather than a state court.” Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 
1126 (6th Cir. 1991). A federal court cannot, therefore, seek to impose §402.080’s 




perceived obligation on the Clerk by disregarding the accommodation that 
Kentucky RFRA requires.  
III. FEDERAL COURTS LACK THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE 
CLERK TO ISSUE MARRIAGE LICENSES UNDER §402.080. 
To non-lawyers in the media, this litigation apparently presents a clear case 
of a public officer shirking her public duty for personal reasons, contrary to the 
Couples’ rights. That begs the question of what specific law the Couples claim the 
Clerk is violating. The obvious candidates are the Due Process Clause, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and §402.080. Of these three, only the first two qualify as 
federal law, but only the third arguably contemplates marriage licenses specifically 
in Rowan County. If this Court determines that the Fourteenth Amendment itself 
does not give the Couples a right to in-person marriage licenses in their county of 
residence, but – like the district court – believes that the Clerk should meet her 
perceived duty under §402.080, this Court must analyze its authority to order the 
Clerk to comply with §402.080.  
For a variety of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional reasons, federal courts 
lack the authority to compel the Clerk to comply with §402.080, regardless of the 
ultimate merits of whether her policies violate §402.080. First, under sovereign 
immunity, the Clerk would be immune from suit in federal court unless the 
Couples assert an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient to invoke the Young 
officer-suit exception to her immunity. Conversely, if the Clerk either lacks 




sovereign immunity or declines to assert it, the Couples potentially could invoke 
§402.080 either by incorporating it into their federal claim under §1988(a) or by 
asserting supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim pursuant to §1367. 
Unfortunately for the Couples, the Kentucky-law conflict between Kentucky 
RFRA and §402.080 undermines all possible avenues for the couples to assert 
§402.080 in federal court. 
A. Sovereign immunity denies federal courts the authority to compel 
the Clerk to issue marriage licenses. 
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Sovereign 
immunity arises also from the Constitution’s structure and antedates the Eleventh 
Amendment, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999), applying equally to 
suits by a state’s own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh 
Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive relief unless the 
state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-16. The test for waiver is “a 
stringent one,” and “consent … must be unequivocally expressed.” Sossamon v. 
Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011) (interior quotations and citations omitted). 
Nothing suggests that Kentucky or the Clerk have waived sovereign immunity for 




the Couples’ suit. 
Under the Young officer-suit exception, sovereign immunity does not bar 
suits in which the plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to 
avert an ongoing violation of federal law. This analysis requires a “straightforward 
inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and 
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (interior quotations omitted). In the 
absence of an ongoing violation of federal law, the Young exception does not 
relieve plaintiffs of the defendant’s immunity. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645; Green v. 
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 66-67 (1985); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 
966 (6th Cir. 2013); cf. U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006) (“no one 
doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce … the provisions’ of the 
Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of 
those provisions”) (emphasis in original). As explained below, the Couples have 
not identified an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient to trigger the Young 
exception to the Clerk’s immunity. 
Although the Clerk did not raise sovereign immunity in her opening brief, 
the defense is sufficiently jurisdictional that she can raise it at any time: the 
“Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.” Edelman, 415 U.S. 




at 678; Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1996). Indeed, 
sovereign immunity is one of the few jurisdictional arguments that defendants can 
raise collaterally to attack an adverse judgment. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 
557 U.S. 137, 152-53 & n.6 (2009). For that reason, amicus EFELDF respectfully 
submits that this Court must consider the Clerk’s immunity if she asserts it in her 
reply brief: “a federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court’s 
jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d at 206 
(emphasis in original, alterations and internal quotations omitted); see Section 
III.A.2, infra. Because the Clerk remains free to assert her immunity in her reply 
brief, the Couples would ignore her immunity at their peril. 
1. Kentucky’s sovereign immunity applies to county clerks. 
Although county clerks in some states may lack their state’s immunity from 
suit under the Eleventh Amendment for some purposes, county clerks in Kentucky 
are immune from suit to the same extent as the state, Schwindel v. Meade Cnty., 
113 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003), at least where they exercise a state function like 
issuing marriage licenses. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc). Under the arm-of-the-state doctrine, political subdivisions such as counties 
and municipalities – which are not generally eligible for sovereign immunity – can 
qualify as immune arms of the state under a multipart test. Id. Here, although they 
disagree about what Kentucky law requires here, the parties agree that the Clerk 




here exercises state-law obligations, not anything originating with Rowan County. 
As such, the Clerk is entitled to sovereign immunity in her marriage-licensing 
transactions. See Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426, 428-31 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Immunity 
hinges on whether the officer represents the State in the particular area or on the 
particular issue in question”) (internal quotations omitted).  
Under Kentucky law, moreover, “County Clerk” is a constitutional office, 
St. Matthews Fire Prot. Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), 
and indeed “the existence of counties predates the Commonwealth itself.” 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 131 n.1 (Ky. 
2004); cf. Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Ky. 2001). 
Further, “when an officer or employee of a governmental agency is sued in [a] 
representative capacity, the officer’s or employee’s actions are afforded the same 
immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself, would be entitled.” Yanero v. Davis, 
65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001). As such, the Clerk is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit.10 
2. The Clerk can raise immunity for the first time on appeal 
and even collaterally after judgment. 
Federal courts analyze immunity and waiver under state law and, because 
                                           
10  Significantly, district judges in Kentucky – i.e., the judges closest to these 
issues – have found that county clerks enjoy Kentucky’s immunity from suit in 
federal court. Morehead v. Barnett, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83461, *4-5, 2014 WL 
2801351 (E.D. Ky. June 19, 2014). 




those state laws vary widely on the ability of officers and their counsel to waive 
immunity, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 n.2 (1975), federal courts generally 
can ignore sovereign immunity until a defendant asserts it. Wisconsin Dep’t of 
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998). Once raised – and even if first 
raised on appeal – the immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional to require its 
consideration. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678. Indeed, sovereign immunity is one of the 
few defenses that a non-prevailing party can raise to attack a judgment collaterally. 
Bailey, 557 U.S. at 152-53 & n.6.  
In Kentucky, only the Legislature can waive sovereign immunity: “It is the 
province of the General Assembly to waive immunity, if at all, and only to the 
extent it sees fit.” Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Roof, Ky, 913 
S.W.2d 322, 325 (1996); Univ. of Kentucky v. Guynn, 372 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 
1963). Significantly, that means that neither state agencies and officers nor the 
lawyers who represent them have the authority to waive sovereign immunity, 
which “would be of small stature if its precepts could be ‘waived’ by any state 
officer or agent other than the general assembly.” Commonwealth, Department of 
Highways v. Davidson, 383 S.W. 2d 346, 348 (Ky. 1964); Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. 
Sys. v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). Further, 
because sovereign immunity can only be waived by the Legislature, that immunity 
can be raised as a defense for the first time on appeal. Wells v. Commonwealth 




Department of Highways, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 308 (1964). Under these clear rules, the 
Clerk can first raise her immunity not only in this interlocutory appeal of the 
preliminary injunction, but also in a collateral attack on the injunction after this 
Court issues its mandate. Bailey, 557 U.S. at 152-53 & n.6. Consequently, this 
Court should consider whether immunity applies. 
This Court honors these state no-waiver rules when applicable. Mixon v. 
Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 396-97 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ohio can raise immunity on appeal, 
notwithstanding counsel’s failure to raise it earlier, because Ohio’s Attorney 
General lacks authority to waive immunity); Freimanis v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 
654 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981) (because a state “has clearly expressed its 
intention to preserve its immunity,” an “attorney for [a state] Department had no 
clearly expressed authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity”). Thus, 
unless the Couples can establish an ongoing violation of federal law, the Clerk can 
assert her immunity in her reply brief.  
3. Unless §1988(a) applies, the Young exception to sovereign 
immunity does not cover violations of state law. 
If the Couples merely seek to enforce §402.080, their case is insufficient to 
trigger the Young exception to the Clerk’s immunity from suit in federal court. 
Simply put, Young does not apply to violations of state law: 
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly 
absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state 
official has violated state law. In such a case the entire 




basis for the doctrine of Young … disappears. A federal 
court’s grant of relief against state officials on the basis 
of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not 
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the 
contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on 
state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state 
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.  
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (emphasis in 
original); accord Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 714 
(6th Cir. 1989) (“Section 1983 … is thus limited to deprivations of federal 
statutory and constitutional rights” and “does not cover official conduct that 
allegedly violates state law) (emphasis in original); Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 
695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980) (courts must examine “defendants’ conduct independent 
of its lawfulness or unlawfulness at state law”); Wideman v. Shallowford 
Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987); Washington v. 
District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Unless the Couples 
can assert an ongoing violation of federal law, this case simply has no place in 
federal court.11 
B. Incorporating state law under §1988(a) cannot save the Couples’ 
federal claims because the Clerk has not violated Kentucky law. 
Under state law, an appropriate court would need to resolve any conflict 
between Kentucky RFRA and §402.080 because both provisions must be read 
together under state law. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 
                                           
11  As explained in note 8, supra, the Couples arguably cannot rely on §1988(a). 




718-19 (Ky. 2012); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
132-33 (2000). Litigants cannot cherry-pick the laws to enforce. Thompson v. 
Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 501 (5th Cir. 2003); In re United Airlines, Inc., 368 
F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2004); Babineau v. Fed’l Express Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 
1193 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Plaintiffs may not cherry-pick only those regulations that 
work in their favor”). For purposes of §1988(a), the Couples would lose under 
either of the two available scenarios: (1) §1988(a) incorporates both Kentucky 
RFRA and §402.080, and the Couples lose their §1988(a)-incorporated due-
process claim on the state-law merits, see Section II, supra; or (2) this Court deems 
Kentucky RFRA inconsistent with federal law and thus cannot incorporate any 
Kentucky law under §1988(a), and the Couples lose their due-process claim on the 
purely federal merits, see Sections I.B-I.C, supra. 
C. Even if the Clerk lacked – or declined to assert – sovereign 
immunity, federal courts would lack supplemental jurisdiction for 
the Couples’ state-law claim. 
Assuming arguendo that sovereign immunity would not preclude review, a 
plaintiff can assert some state-law claims in federal courts under the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute: “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). Federal courts should decline 




that jurisdiction, however, under certain circumstances, including when: (1) “the 
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,” or (2) “the claim substantially 
predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original 
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(1)-(2). Because both exceptions apply here, this 
Court should vacate the preliminary injunction to the extent that it relies upon 
supplemental jurisdiction.12 
Significantly, the Couples and the district court have not yet claimed 
supplemental jurisdiction for §402.080-based claims. While this Court could 
remand the initial supplemental-jurisdiction question to the district court, Cooper 
v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 953 (6th Cir. 2000), this appeal requires an answer now. 
Under the exceptions in §1367(c)(1) and §1367(c)(2), this Court should not 
exercise its discretion to allow the Couples to press their §402.080-based claims 
under §1367 because the state §402.080 claim predominates here and, what is 
worse, requires a novel state-law balancing with Kentucky RFRA that this Court 
lacks authority to perform. 
CONCLUSION 
The preliminary injunction must be reversed.  
                                           
12  Even rejecting the Couples’ federal claims while allowing them to enforce 
§402.080 under §1367 would be significant; unlike federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, state-law claims under §1367 pose no attorney-fee liability. 42 U.S.C. 
§1988(b). 
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